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INTRODUCTION
For years, historians depicted the history of human rights as the inexo-
rable triumph of universal norms.1 This account underestimates both the
historical and contemporary uncertainty surrounding many international
human rights. As even casual observers must note, the tale of human
rights progress is not littered with beneficent heads of state persuaded to
pursue progress by the moral charge of universal norms. Instead, this his-
tory’s primary scenes feature struggles among great powers, peoples, and
movements advancing diverse interests. Recognizing the complexity of
human rights history, a new generation of historians2 has emphasized that
human rights progress is not preordained, but rather requires the align-
ment of powerful actors’ self-interests with human rights goals.3
Building off insights gleaned from these new revisionist histories, this
Note provides a more accurate account of human rights evolution during
the period from World War I to the signing of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Though there were important events in human rights his-
tory before and after this era, the foundation of contemporary human
rights law was built during this thirty-year period. Properly understanding
the interests and actors that shaped this foundation will assist in predicting
and influencing the future growth of human rights law.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I begins by describing how both
historicism and legal realism assist in developing new, more accurate, ac-
counts of human rights history. Part II then synthesizes material from new
historical works to provide a more accurate depiction of human rights de-
velopment in the period under consideration. Finally, Part III explores
contemporaneous accounts of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights’ passage to demonstrate the importance of referencing primary
sources.
I. REALISM VERSUS IDEALISM: THE INSIGHTS HISTORICISM AND
LEGAL REALISM PROVIDE INTO HUMAN RIGHTS HISTORY
For decades, the dominant historical narrative portrayed the rise of
human rights as preordained. Even historians who appreciated human
rights’ non-Western influences “naively romanticized” the past and “pre-
sent[ed] [it] only as a nostalgic storehouse of incipient, benevolent ideas
awaiting their almost inevitable self-realization in present-day human
1. Given that “the idea of fundamental rights—‘human’ or ‘natural’—has been
deeply contested since the birth of modernity in Europe in the 17th century,” it is surprising
that today many individuals overlook human rights’ complicated roots and continual struggle
for relevance. Steven Greer, Being “Realistic” About Human Rights, 60 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 147,
148 (2009).
2. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD (2005); SA-
MUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010); Mark Mazower, The
Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950, 47 HIST. J. 379 (2004).
3. On occasions, however, efforts by powerful actors to quell human rights progress
actually backfired in the long run. See infra p. 46–47.
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rights activism.”4 Paul Gordon Lauren, for instance, accurately identifies
the many cultural, philosophical, and religious roots of human rights, but
nevertheless depicts these roots as dormant progenitors of later human
rights progress. Lauren states, “[d]espite all the formidable odds and
forces aligned against them, these visions could not be extinguished and
those visionaries who saw them refused to be silenced. Upheavals in the
eighteenth century and successes in the nineteenth century gave them
hope. Horrors of the twentieth century gave them determination.”5
In Inventing Human Rights: A History, Lynn Hunt describes human
rights as “self-evident.”6 Hunt alleges that the “self-evident” character of
human rights leads to the following paradox: “[I]f equality of rights is so
self-evident, then why did this assertion have to [be] made and why was it
only made in specific times and places?”7 Hunt fails to recognize that the
paradox derives from a faulty premise, namely that human rights are self-
evident in the first place. Only after looking beyond this premise is it pos-
sible to understand why human rights history consists of divergent views
and disparate results. Hunt presents a Whig history—“a historical narra-
tive that reveals a clear evolutionary path towards progress.”8 Whig histo-
ries may provide an attractive narrative to contemporary human rights
activists who see their efforts as part of an age-old struggle to define and
protect human rights.9 However, such accounts are antithetical to the gen-
eral historian’s mission of narrating “a given historical moment by putting
himself in the context of that moment.”10
Historian Marc Bloch’s theory concerning the “idol of origins” ex-
plains the persistent attractiveness of Whig histories to scholars like
Hunt.11 In the Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, Samuel Moyn de-
scribes Bloch’s theory as follows:
4. William J. Novak, Legal Realism and Human Rights, 37 HIST. EUR. IDEAS 168, 170
(2011).
5. PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
VISIONS SEEN 2 (2d ed. 2003). Lauren offers an impressive introductory history on human
rights development that details the role of Great Power politics throughout this history. How-
ever, countless quotes, such as the one in the above text, depict human rights as universal
truths waiting to take root in the proper climate. If we take such language on its face, then
Lauren views Great Power conflict and realpolitik as a mere obstacle for these universal
truths to overcome, rather than an independent force that shapes the actual meaning and
understanding of human rights.
6. LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS 214 (2007).
7. Id. at 19.
8. See Justin Zaremby, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Human Rights
Law: Reading Samuel Moyn’s The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, 15 YALE H.R. &
DEV. L.J. 155, 155 (2012). This term gained prominence following historian Herbert Butter-
field’s use of the term to describe romanticized visions of English constitutional history. See
id. at 159.
9. See id. at 170.
10. Id.
11. MOYN, supra note 2, at 41–42
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It is tempting to assume that the trickle of melted snow in the
mountains is the source of all the water in a great downstream
flood, when, in fact, the flood depends on new sources where the
river swells. They may be unseen and underground; and they
come from somewhere else. History, Bloch concluded, is not
about tracing antecedents. Even what continuity there is depends
on novelty, and persistence of old things is due to new causes as
time passes.12
Only by searching for these novel causes—the tributaries of the metaphor-
ical river of history—can scholars provide nuanced understandings of his-
torical movements. Historicism and legal realism each provide insights
that combat the idol of origins temptation inherent in Whig histories like
Hunt’s and Lauren’s.
For instance, in regards to the evolution of human rights, Professor
William Novak notes that “historicism emphasizes historical particularity
and specificity—that the best way to understand the emergence, evolution,
and meaning of human rights is to understand in detail the way such rights
are articulated and used at particular times, in particular situations, for
particular purposes.”13 The historicist believes any accurate human rights
history not only identifies, but engages with the massive influences that
have shaped this history, including colonialism, realpolitik, capitalism, and
nationalism.
Legal realism’s skepticism towards moral or religious legal rationales
accords with many insights of historicism. For instance, Oliver Wendell
Holmes—chief champion of the legal realist movement—“attacked the
notion of law (and rights) as divinely inspired, as moral imperative, as for-
mally deductive logic, or as scientific principle.”14 In place of first princi-
ples rooted in nature or the divine, legal realists proposed consequentialist
analyses of legal rules and standards. This pragmatic15 approach jettisoned
unresolvable metaphysical debates for cost-benefit analyses utilized in the
burgeoning social science field.
12. Id.
13. Novak, supra note 4, at 170.
14. Id. at 172. This Note’s primary influence is the traditional legal realist movement
that infiltrated American legal institutions in the early and mid-twentieth century. The realist
international relations theory is a distinct doctrine, but it also has, albeit to a lesser degree,
influenced scholars’ understanding of human rights development. Jack Goldsmith and Eric
Posner understand realism in the context of international law to imply that “international law
emerges from states acting rationally to maximize their interests, given their perceptions of
the interests of other states and the distribution of state power.” JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC
A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005).
15. Scholars have attributed the rise of the legal realist movement largely to the prag-
matist philosophical tradition. See Novak, supra note 4 (citing B. KUKLICK, THE RISE OF
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY, 1860–1930 (1970); J. T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SO-
CIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT,
1870–1920 (1988); L. MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA
(2001).
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How do legal realist principles provide a more nuanced understanding
of human rights development? The tenets of legal realism oppose “the
notion that there exists ‘out there’ some correct, apolitical, and non-coer-
cive private social order to which human beings naturally and spontane-
ously aspire, frustrated only by the incessant corruptions of power
spawned by the interventions of politics and state.”16 Thus, legal realists
oppose historical accounts of human rights progress that replace searching
inquiries into the people, events, and forces that shaped such progress for
romanticized Whig histories.17 Together, historicism and legal realism pro-
vide a framework to better understand the evolution, and occasionally
devolution, of human rights.
Recently, scholars have taken guidance from historicism and legal re-
alism to better understand the development of human rights. Samuel
Moyn, Elizabeth Borgwardt, and Mark Mazower are three leading authors
in this movement. All three skillfully use historicist insights to provide
more realistic historical analyses.
In The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, for instance, Moyn criti-
cizes the trend of “recasting world history as raw material for the progres-
sive ascent of international human rights.”18 This trend, Moyn aptly notes,
explains why historians “have rarely conceded that earlier history left
open diverse paths into the future, rather than paving a single road toward
current ways of thinking and acting.”19 The result has been an almost
unanimous “celebratory attitude” among contemporary historians “to-
ward[s] the emergence and progress of human rights.”20
Similarly, Elizabeth Borgwardt, in A New Deal for the World, “ex-
plores the struggles of negotiators to design and explain their global plans
for economic, political, and legal systems,” focusing “particularly on the
transition to what is now sometimes called the modern human rights re-
gime.”21 Like Moyn, Borgwardt’s work explores how the “strategic land-
scape” of international relations shaped the path and ultimate form of
human rights throughout history.22
Mark Mazower, in Governing the World, offers another iconoclastic
interpretation, this time in regards to international geopolitical coopera-
tion. Inquiring into “why first the British, at the height of their world
power, and then the Americans should have invested time and political
16. Novak, supra note 4, at 173.
17. Mark Mazower criticizes Whig interpretations of human rights history as follows:
“It does no service to the cause of human rights to disguise the political struggles and con-
flicts of interest that accompanied their emergence in the international arena. On the con-
trary, a better understanding of that story, their relationship to prior rights regimes, and their
dependence on the international balance of power may help us recognize their true weight
and worth.” Mazower, supra note 2, at 397.
18. MOYN, supra note 2, at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 10–11.
22. Id. at 11.
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capital in building up international institutions at all,” Mazower provides a
historicist inquiry into a question most historians explain “as the gradual
triumph of a virtuous sense of global community.”23 Mazower stresses that
the British following the Great War and later the Americans in the wake
of WWII had “good reasons of their own to accept the compromises inher-
ent in an internationalist policy.”24 The sections below draw substantially
from these three authors in detailing the forces shaping and defining the
path of human rights development.
II. GREAT POWER ORIGINS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Inability to Secure Lasting Peace in the
Wake of World War I
The end of WWI provided the United States its first opportunity to
influence human rights on a truly global scale. The various Hague and
Geneva conventions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century es-
tablished basic warfare guidelines, but did not aim to ameliorate the condi-
tions that incubated conflict.25 President Woodrow Wilson responded to
WWI’s carnage by drafting the framework of an international organization
based on liberal, free market, and human rights principles.26 Opposed to
power “determined by the sword,”27 the idealist Wilson believed that es-
tablishing an “equality of rights” among nations—both large and small—
would create a “common strength” to prevent another world war.28
However, the international entity emerging from the Treaty of Ver-
sailles lacked the array of legal instruments proposed by various American
interest groups.29 Mazower describes the League of Nations as including
an exceptionally weak executive relegated to carrying out mundane ad-
ministrative tasks; a two-house legislature consisting of a Great Power-
dominated upper house that operated under unanimity and a lower house
23. MARK MAZOWER, GOVERNING THE WORLD: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA xv (2012).
24. Id. at xvi.
25. See generally JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARA-
TIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 (1915); GARY D. SOLIS & FRED L. BORCH, GENEVA CONVENTIONS
6–10 (2010).
26. At the end of WWI, the Bolshevist movement and its underlying communist ideol-
ogy presented an alternative option for international order. However, “despite early near-
successes in Hungary, Germany, and elsewhere, efforts to expand the socialist revolution
westward failed, and as Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) consolidated his rule, the dream of interna-
tional socialist rights yielded in the Soviet Union to a repressive bureaucratic state.” MICHE-
LINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 177 (2008).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 178.
29. The League to Enforce Peace, headed by William Howard Taft, “wanted all ‘justi-
ciable’ disputes to be submitted to an international court by league members (and all other
disputes to be submitted to a panel of arbitrators), who would sign up to fight any state that
declared war before making such a submission.” MAZOWER, supra note 23, at 121. Taft was
not the only member of the presidential fraternity to enter the debate. Theodore Roosevelt
advocated the establishment of a World League for the Peace of Righteousness, equipped
with an “international police force” to enforce the rule of law. Id. at 120.
Summer 2014] Great Power Origins of Human Rights 833
lacking any law making capabilities; and an international court— the Per-
manent Court of International Justice— made ineffectual by the League’s
limited enforcement mechanisms.30
Despite the international organization’s relative meekness by today’s
standards, U.S. public opinion doomed the League’s Senate ratification.
To politicians and citizens of the period, the League represented an un-
precedented entanglement of U.S. and European interests. Given the
modern understanding of the League’s institutional ineptitude, it is sur-
prising to hear Idaho Senator William E. Borah’s denunciation of the
League as “a scheme of world control based on force . . .  [where] [t]he
maxim of liberty will soon give way to the rule of blood and iron.”31
Borah’s rhetoric reflected Congress’s fear of permanent commitment to
international cooperation. As   Mazower contends, “the negotiations in
Paris had revealed that even as powerful and charismatic a figure as Wil-
son was obliged to compromise once the maps came out and the bargain-
ing began.”32 This insight buttressed the “old arguments for remaining
aloof”33 and ultimately led the Senate to reject U.S. League membership.
Cognizant of his domestic failure, Wilson sought to leave his mark on
international cooperation by enshrining religious and racial equality in the
League’s charter. Wilson and British representative Robert Cecil initially
planned on including a general guarantee “of equality of treatment for ‘all
racial or national minorities’ and of freedom of religious expression for all
beliefs ‘whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public
morals.’”34 However, the majority of U.S. and British representatives op-
posed ensuring racial equality, fearful that “imprecise and wide-ranging
definitions might encourage discontented subjects within their own and
other jurisdictions to seek to appeal to the League over the authority of
the state—the examples of potential appellants often cited were African-
Americans and the Irish.”35
With self-interest eliminating U.S. and British support, Japanese dele-
gate Baron Makino was alone in proposing a racial equality provision.
This proposal garnered majority support at the commission level only to
reach its anticipated demise at the hands of the U.S. and UK delegations
in the drafting committee.36 After this rejection, Wilson recognized the
30. See id. at 136.
31. Id. at 138–39.
32. Id. at 140.
33. Id. at 139.
34. ALAN SHARP, CONSEQUENCES OF PEACE: THE VERSAILLES SETTLEMENT: AFTER-
MATH AND LEGACY 1919-2010 137 (2011).
35. MAZOWER, supra note 23, at 137. Decades later, debates surrounding the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights’ potential binding character provide one example of Mark
Twain’s quote that “history does not repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” Ian Cowie, History
does not Repeat Itself, but is Often Rhymes, as Mark Twain Noted, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 20,
2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/comment/iancowie/5018093/
History-does-not-repeat-itself-but-it-often-rhymes-as-Mark-Twain-noted.html.
36. Jan Herman Burgers, The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights
Idea in the Twentieth Century, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 447, 449 (1992).
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hypocrisy of advancing a proposal concerning religious freedom and thus
tabled the issue.37
Provisions affirming universal racial and religious equality did not ex-
haust the efforts to advance international cooperation and peace at the
Conference. The most successful effort was the development of the minor-
ity treaty system.38 The Wilsonian principle of self-determination
prompted the Great Powers to incorporate new Eastern European states
into the international system.39 For these new states, international recogni-
tion, or admission to the League of Nations, came at the cost of ensuring
the protection of minority rights.40 Treaties and declarations with Austria,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Romania,
Yugoslavia, Albania, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania contained
minority clauses of various forms.41
Minority clauses represented an unprecedented intrusion of interna-
tional law into national sovereignty.42 In The Road to San Francisco: The
Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century, Jan Herman
Burgers describes the three obligations imposed by the minority clauses
and enforced by the League of Nations:
Firstly, it guaranteed full and complete protection of life and lib-
erty to all inhabitants of the country or region concerned, without
distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. Sec-
ondly, it guaranteed that all nationals would be equal before the
law and would enjoy the same civil and political rights, without
distinction as to race, language or religion. Thirdly, it provided for
a series of special guarantees for nationals belonging to minorities,
for instance concerning the use of their language and the right to
establish social and religious institutions.43
These lofty guarantees appear to indicate an unprecedented concern for
minority rights on behalf of the Great Powers.
37. Id.
38. This was not the first time European powers dealt with the protection of minority
rights. In the 19th century, before the Great Powers would fully recognize Greece, Bulgaria,
Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania they “demanded that [they] give a formal undertaking to
comply with certain principles of governance (a ‘standard of civilization’ in the contemporary
phrase), in particular that it would guarantee religious toleration and undertake not to ex-
clude individuals from public office or civic rights on religious grounds.” As these demands
demonstrate, “the protection of the civic rights of minority religious groups was something
imposed on the small states of Eastern Europe when the great powers recognized their inde-
pendence and agreed to major changes in their territorial boundaries.” Sharp, supra note 32,
at 135.
39. Mazower, supra note 2, at 382.
40. Id.
41. Burgers, supra note 35, at 449–50.
42. Id. at 450.
43. Id.
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Though the Great Powers were concerned about minority rights, this
concern was—at least in part—fueled by self-interest. As Mazower notes,
the threat that “new states could well contribute to destabilizing the region
by the harsh handling of their minorities”44 frightened the war weary Eu-
ropean powers. Minority treaties allayed this fear by legally committing
new states to protecting minority rights and establishing a remedial frame-
work within the League to handle complaints. The decision to restrict the
treaties to Europe—the hotbed of conflict during WWI—verifies the
Great Powers’ regional stability concerns and undermines any contention
the clauses merely reflected universal human rights aspirations.45
With this in mind, it is unsurprising that the Great Powers were unwill-
ing to extend minority protection to their own jurisdictions. This irony was
not lost on the fledgling eastern European states. In The Versailles Settle-
ment: Aftermath and Legacy 1919-2010, Alan Sharp details objections
voiced by Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia that the “minority
system” “abrogated state sovereignty[,] implied the inferiority of East Eu-
ropean states,” and reeked of hypocrisy.46 Wilson failed to push for logical
consistency either by universalizing the minority system or by removing its
conditions altogether. To Wilson, “nothing . . . [was] more likely to disturb
the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circum-
stances be meted out to minorities.”47 This belief led him to favor a minor-
ity system limited by Great Power politics over jettisoning such a system
altogether.
Much as isolationism defeated the U.S.’s League membership, Euro-
pean powers’ unwillingness to enforce treaty obligations crippled the mi-
nority system.48 Initially, only League member states could raise concerns
regarding minority treaty violations.49 The Great Powers’ hesitancy to po-
lice the treatment of minorities in other jurisdictions, along with states’
obvious aversion to raising claims against their own domestic treatment of
minorities, produced a dearth of claims.50
44. Mazower, supra note 2, at 382. Although the Versailles Settlement produced new
states formed around various ethnic and national identities, it “still left 30,000,000 people in
states in which they were not part of the dominant nationality.” ALAN SHARP, THE VER-
SAILLES SETTLEMENT: PEACEMAKING IN PARIS, 1919 155 (1991). In a statement before the
Senate, President Wilson revealed his prior ignorance of the sheer number of minority
groups spread across Europe: “When I have utterance to those words (‘that all nations had a
right to self-determination’), I said them without knowledge that nationalities existed, which
are coming to us day after day . . . You do not know and cannot appreciate the anxieties that I
have experienced as the result of many millions of people having their hopes raised by what I
have said.” Id. at 156.
45. See Mazower, supra note 2, at 382.
46. SHARP, supra note 33, at 140.
47. Id.
48. See Mazower, supra note 2, at 382–83.
49. See SHARP, supra note 33, at 143.
50. See id.
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Accordingly, the treaty system was amended in 1920 to grant minority
groups the right to petition the League directly.51 On certain occasions,
however, states threatened domestic groups raising such claims with trea-
son.52 In The History of Human Rights, Micheline Ishay identifies the ulti-
mate irony of the minority treaty system: “Invoking Wilson’s notion of
national unity and territorial sovereignty for homogeneous ethnic groups,
Germany used the presence of three million Germans within Czechoslova-
kia’s borders as justification for its occupation of the Sudetenland.”53
B. World War II: A Second Chance in the Aftermath of Destruction
With the League of Nations unwilling and unable to quell Germany’s
expansionist visions, Europe descended into another world war. As WWII
raged in Europe, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt considered a plan
for post-war world order. Roosevelt learned from Wilson’s failure that
“negotiating positions tended to harden quickly after an armistice, and na-
tions soon turned inward once victory was assured, in a natural eagerness
to focus on long-neglected domestic priorities.”54 With this insight in
mind, Roosevelt embarked for his first wartime meeting with Winston
Churchill in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.
1. The Atlantic Charter: Lofty Goals for the Post-War World
Roosevelt and Churchill’s August 1941 meeting produced one of the
most influential, non-binding human rights documents in history. Al-
though some scholars believe the conspicuous absence of the term human
rights from the document’s text bars its classification as a human rights
instrument,55 this view ignores the document’s real world impact.
Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s intentions aside, the document served as
an inspiration for oppressed peoples throughout the world. In his autobi-
ography, Nelson Mandela notes, “The Atlantic Charter of 1941, signed by
Roosevelt and Churchill, reaffirmed faith in the dignity of each human
being and propagated a host of democratic principles. Some in the West
saw the Charter as empty promises, but not those of us in Africa.”56 The
principles enshrined in the Atlantic Charter—most importantly the right
to self-determination and “the assurance that all the men in all lands may
live out their lives in freedom from fear and want”57—also rallied the orig-
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. ISHAY, supra note 26, at 189.
54. BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 14.
55. MOYN, supra note 2, at 89 (arguing that “going so far to label the Atlantic Charter
a ‘human rights instrument,’ setting the terms for all the generosity that followed, ignores
that it did not include the phrase ‘human rights’ – the consecration of which in the 1940s
dropped the concept of self-determination that the charter did, in fact, feature”).
56. NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 83–84 (1st ed. 1994).
57. This language in the Atlantic Charter represents a monumental shift from the mi-
nority treaties. Instead of focusing on collective minority rights, the Atlantic Charter applies
to all men. Despite the Charter’s gendered language, it is likely Roosevelt and Churchill
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inal United Nations58 in their fight against the Axis Powers by juxtaposing
the warring sides’ distinct moral stances.59
While Roosevelt and Churchill agreed on the charter’s overarching
structure, both leaders possessed interests that posed difficulties for the
drafting process. Churchill’s commitment to protecting Britain’s favorable
trade relations with Commonwealth countries led to the qualification, and
ultimate vitiation, of Roosevelt’s free trade provision.60 The final text
stated: “[The parties] will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obli-
gations, to further the enjoyment of all states, great or small, victor or
vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materi-
als of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity”61 (em-
phasis added). Roosevelt was particularly concerned with protecting
himself from isolationist ire and thus forbid the inclusion of establishing an
“effective international organization” as one of the Charter’s goals.62
Though Roosevelt and Churchill slightly altered the Charter’s structure to
align with their interests, the isolation of the Atlantic Ocean shielded both
leaders from the difficult political question of specifying what individuals
fell within the Charter’s exact contours.
In the months and years following the Charter’s proclamation,63 both
leaders—and the nations they represented—were forced to publicly en-
gage in the discussion they willfully avoided on the hulls of the Prince of
Wales—the British battleship stationed in the Atlantic.64 Mandela’s global-
ist vision was at odds with Churchill’s belief that the document was an
intended the Charter to apply to women, subject to contemporary domestic inequalities. Joel
E. Oestreich explains this evolution as follows: “[The] lesson of WWII was that emphasizing
minorities and highlighting their differences through special protections encouraged groups
to define themselves in opposition to others [and] Nazi racial doctrines appeared to be the
inevitable result of such a course.” He therefore finds Roosevelt and Churchill’s shift in rhet-
oric unsurprising. Joel E. Oestreich, Liberal Theory and Minority Group Rights, 21 HUM.
RTS. Q. 108, 113 (1999).
58. President Roosevelt’s term “United Nations” – not to be confused with the inter-
national organization established following WWII bearing the same name – replaced the
relatively mundane term “Associated Powers” in 1941. See MAZOWER, supra note 23, at 197.
59. See id. at 198.
60. See BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 25–28.
61. The Atlantic Charter, N. Atlantic Treaty Org. (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natolive/official_texts_16912.htm.
62. See BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 27 (noting that “the president’s unwillingness to
take a principled stand in favor of what are generally assumed to be his innate international-
ist impulses might well have been due entirely to the virulence of the isolationist reaction to
his recently approved Lend-Lease bill . . . Senator Wheeler had memorably asserted that
active support for Britain . . . was ‘the New Deal’s Triple-A foreign policy; it would plow
under every fourth American boy.”)
63. The Atlantic Charter was originally released through telegram on August 14, 1941.
See id. at 4.
64. It may seem unproductive to define the contours of a proclamation lacking legal
authority. This understanding, however, ignores the millions of individuals who believed the
Atlantic Charter embodied sound moral principles and fails to address the role of customary
international law. Article 38 of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the League of
Nation’s judicial organ, included international custom as a form of international law. If the
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“ephemeral press release intended for European ears only, intended to
shore up Britain’s sagging morale and the hopes of the invaded countries
in Europe.”65
Indeed, the narrowness of Churchill’s vision—and the extent to which
it explicitly rejected Mandela’s globalism—was highlighted by an unusu-
ally public disagreement at the highest levels of British politics. Delivering
a speech to Nigerian students in London, Clement Atlee, Churchill’s Dep-
uty Prime Minister, anticipated Mandela’s universalist vision, stating,
“[y]esterday I was privileged to announce [the] declaration of principle by
the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of this country.
You will find these principles will apply, I believe, to all peoples of the
world.”66 Atlee’s sojourn into the universalist sphere prompted Churchill
to deliver a speech in the House of Commons affirming the Charter’s lim-
ited scope.67
In contrast to Churchill, Roosevelt initially appeared willing to en-
dorse a universalist vision for the Charter. Without the concerns of an em-
pire informing his politics, Roosevelt was free to state, “[w]e of the United
Nations [i.e., Allied Powers] are agreed on certain broad principles in the
kind of peace we seek. The Atlantic Charter applies not only to the parts
of the world that border the Atlantic but to the whole world.”68 The Dum-
barton Oaks Conference provided Roosevelt a chance to validate this lofty
rhetoric through action.
2. Dumbarton Oaks: Great Power Politics and Human Rights
The elite character of the states participating in the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference allowed keen international observers to predict the confer-
ence’s results for human rights. Representatives from the United States,
Britain, the Soviet Union, and China met for seven weeks in 1944,69 but
“as the Big Three [that is the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union]
developed their proposals, no diplomat so much as mentioned human
rights in the run-up to the critical planning meetings that began in late
August.”70 As the reference to the Big Three implies, China failed to se-
cure a room in the Great Power fraternity. Although formally included in
the Conference, the Big Three excluded Chinese representatives from the
Conference’s primary discussion round.71
“general principles” expressed in the Atlantic Charter were accepted by other nations, then
they arguably could form a source of international law. See Id. at 41.
65. Id. at 34.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 36.
69. LAUREN, supra note 5, at 160–61.
70. MOYN, supra note 2, at 56.
71. See id. Angered at being left out of preliminary negotiations at Dumbarton Oaks,
the Chinese leaked the main preparatory documents to the New York Times. See id.
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With China out of the picture, at least initially, the onus was on one of
the Big Three to advance human rights. Gladwyn Jebb, the diplomat
spearheading British planning for post-war international order, failed to
include any mention of human rights in his first draft detailing a post-war
international organization,72 making it unlikely Britain would lead the cru-
sade at the Conference. Given the treatment of individuals throughout the
British Empire, the British were wary that “such a provision might facili-
tate meddling by the new international body in the affairs of the em-
pire.”73 The Soviets possessed a similar fear—this one more acute given
the barbarity of Stalin’s Gulag system.74
With the British and Soviets out, the Americans were human rights’
final hope. Consistent with his interpretation of the Atlantic Charter,
Roosevelt supported some reference to human rights.75 The political clout
of isolationists in Washington, however, weighed heavily on Roosevelt’s
mind. Mark Mazower depicts Roosevelt as caught between competing
forces, stating:
The administration felt caught between the Scylla of isolationists,
anxious to preserve the constitution of the US from outside inter-
vention, and the Charybdis of internationalists who were inspired
by Roosevelt’s idealistic rhetoric and believed the administration
should take seriously its mission of building a freer world.76
To buttress their case, isolationists emphasized domestic concerns that
arguably militated in favor of protecting domestic sovereignty from
outside intervention. Chief among these concerns was the continued op-
pression and discrimination of the United States’ African American
population.77
With these competing interests in mind, the American delegation pro-
posed a human rights provision reading:
The International Organization should refrain from intervention
in the internal affairs of any state, it being the responsibility of
each state to see that conditions prevailing within its jurisdiction
do not endanger international peace and security and, to this end,
to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its
people and to govern in accordance with the principles of human-
ity and justice.78
This clever drafting provided rhetorical support for human rights, while
affirming states’ plenary power within their borders. Even this draft provi-
72. See Mazower, supra note 2, at 391.
73. Id.
74. See LAUREN, supra note 5, at 163.
75. See Mazower, supra note 2, at 391.
76. Id. at 391–92.
77. See LAUREN, supra note 5, at 162.
78. Mazower, supra note 2, at 392.
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sion proved unpalatable to the Soviets and British, however, who “feared
that a general statement about human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the section on general principles for the United Nations would open a
Pandora’s box [sic] and release dangerous forces that would seriously
threaten their sovereignty and power.”79
By the time the Chinese joined deliberations, the Big Three had de-
cided that human rights concerns would play a minor role at the confer-
ence. Unwilling to accept the United States’ relatively innocuous human
rights provision, the British and Soviets immediately rejected Chinese pro-
posals to make the new organization “universal in character” and commit-
ted to the “principle of equality of all states and races.”80 The Big Three
agreed to bury human rights “deep within the text”81 by confining them to
economic and social cooperation.
The Conference’s limited membership, and the early relegation of
human rights to an afterthought, indicated the Great Powers would domi-
nate any international structure. Moyn notes that “the real dispute at the
conference, and indeed later, revolved around the Security Council, its
voting formula, and the veto.”82 The Conference produced an initial
framework consisting of a dominant Security Council occupied by Great
Power representatives and a much weaker General Assembly.83 Although
the Conference failed to produce specific rules governing the veto power –
an issue Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt would settle at Yalta84, British
diplomat Charles Webster noted, “later embellishments did not touch the
essential points” decided at Dumbarton Oaks.85
The Dumbarton Oaks Conference left small nations, international in-
terest groups, and many domestic constituencies unhappy. The “very
height of expectations” leading up to the Conference “made the fall so
precipitous when they failed to materialize.”86 With human rights practi-
cally omitted from the pages of the Dumbarton Oaks agreements, interna-
79. LAUREN, supra note 5, at 163.
80. Id. at 161–62.
81. Id. at 163.
82. MOYN, supra note 2, at 57.
83. LAUREN, supra note 5, at 164–65.
84. See MOYN, supra note 2, at 57.
85. Id. at 57.
86. LAUREN, supra note 5, at 167. However, not all individuals shared this view. Carlos
Romulo, chief delegate of the Philippines to the United Nations Conference, appeared satis-
fied with the decisions at Dumbarton Oaks, stating, “[t]he outline of the [United Nations]
Charter as drafted at Dumbarton Oaks was more or less an echo of those four principles of
the Atlantic Charter. The essence of the Atlantic Charter was in the draft. . . .” CARLOS P.
ROMULO, FORTY YEARS: A THIRD WORLD SOLDIER AT THE UN 7 (1986). Protestant theolo-
gian Reinhold Niebuhr expressed skepticism that including human rights into the agreements
without an adequate enforcement power would nevertheless promote human rights progress.
He stated, “Nor would the Dumbarton Oaks agreements be substantially improved by the
insertion of some international bill of rights which has no relevance, and would have no
efficacy, in a world alliance of states.” Ralph Barton Perry, Working Basis Seen, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 1945.
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tionalists excitedly awaited an opportunity to share their views at the
United Nations’ conference.
C. San Francisco: Another Chance to Secure Human Rights Progress
1. Preparing for San Francisco at the Chapultepec Conference
After reading the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, delegates from less
powerful nations understood securing Great Power concessions would be
something akin to pulling teeth. Nevertheless, they were committed to em-
bedding human rights in the structure of the international organization.
In the months preceding and throughout the San Francisco Confer-
ence that produced the United Nations Charter, Latin American states
were human rights’ leading torchbearers. Dismayed by the United States’
failure to include Latin American states in the discussions at Dumbarton
Oaks, representatives of twenty Latin American nations met at the Cha-
pultepec Castle in Mexico City and dissected the Dumbarton Oaks pro-
posals.87 Delegates submitted over one hundred and fifty draft resolutions
addressing Great Power dominance, economic and social problems, and
human rights, among other issues.88 The delegates devoted specific atten-
tion to the last of these concerns.89 In particular, “one of the resolutions
[they] adopted dealt specifically with the international protection of fun-
damental human rights. The resolution called for an international declara-
tion that would define those rights and the corresponding duties.”90 Many
Latin American delegates at the Chapultepec Conference later repre-
sented their states in San Francisco and saw their mission as implementing
the principles of the Chapultepec Conference.91
2. Non-governmental Organization Participation
The legion of small states at the San Francisco Conference garnered
additional support from forty-two non-governmental organizations.92 In
an “unprecedented” move, the State Department invited these groups “os-
tensibly to serve as consultants but also to help with publicizing and advo-
cating for the charter among their home constituencies after the
conference was over.”93 The wide array of groups, including the American
Legion, the American Bar Association, the Rotary Club, and the NAACP,
represented interests canvassing the majority of the American electo-
rate.94 Despite concern among some NGO leaders that their presence was
mere “window dressing,” in the aggregate, the NGOs took their responsi-
87. See LAUREN, supra note 5, at 170.
88. See id.
89. See Burgers, supra NOTE 36, at 475.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 476.
92. See BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 189.
93. Id.
94. See id.
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bilities seriously and were able to successfully advance human rights dis-
course at the Conference.95
3. The Conference’s Proceedings
Following the excitement of the San Francisco Conference’s opening
ceremony,96 state delegates split into smaller committees to discuss dele-
gated topics.97 To protect the broad framework detailed at Dumbarton
Oaks and affirmed at Yalta, the Great Powers maintained close supervi-
sion of committee meetings and scheduled nightly consultation meetings.98
Cooperation in committee meetings allowed the Great Powers to protect
their interests. Alex Cadogan, member of the British delegation, described
his general experience in committee as follows:
I generally sit next to the American . . .  and we conspire together
to try to whack obstructionists on the head . . .  I tell him he’s our
heavy artillery and I am the sniper. It works quite well and we
wiped the floor with a Mexican last night: I think we must have
shut him up for a week or so . . . .99
In regards to the ultimate structural foundations of the United Na-
tions, these committee meetings served as little more than sounding
boards to appease the international community’s desire for discussion.100
Despite extensive cooperation among the Great Powers in obstructing
the voices of the lesser powers, there were still considerable disagreements
between the U.S., Soviets and British. In areas of disagreement, such as
regional defense, the definition of true democracy, and the meaning of
international human rights,101 input during committee meetings was
influential.
As the Chapultepec Conference portended, the last of these enumer-
ated topics dominated many less powerful countries’ concerns. These
95. Id. at 190.
96. Paul Gordon Lauren describes the opening ceremony as follows:
The opening speeches of the United Nations Conference on International Organi-
zation delivered in the elegant setting of the San Francisco Opera House during
April 1945 conveyed both a spirit of extraordinary euphoria and a sense of respon-
sibility. Flushed with military victories against their adversaries and excited about
participating in what they knew would be one of the century’s most historic events,
several hundred representatives and their staffs could hardly contain their
enthusiasm.
LAUREN, supra note 5, at 177.
97. See id. at 178.
98. See id. at 179.
99. ALEXANDER CADOGAN, THE DIARIES OF SIR ALEXANDER CADOGAN 742 (David
Dilks ed., 1971).
100. LAUREN, supra note 5, at 187 (noting that “in many ways the Charter closely re-
sembled the Dumbarton Oaks proposals”).
101. See id. at 179.
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countries, with the support of NGOs, proposed human rights amendments
to the official charter.102 Egypt, Mexico, France, Guatemala, Paraguay, In-
dia, New Zealand, Norway, Lebanon, Cuba, and South Africa all believed
a fundamental purpose of the United Nations should be promoting human
rights and submitted amendments to this effect.103
When possible, NGOs also tried to exert influence on the Great Pow-
ers. On one occasion, for instance, U.S. NGOs demanded a meeting with
Secretary of State Stettinius. During this meeting, Judge Joseph Proskauer
recalls rising from his seat and saying to Secretary Stettinius:
If you make a fight for these human rights proposals and win,
there will be glory for all. If you make a fight for it and lose, we
will back you up to the limit. If you fail to make a fight for it, you
will have lost the support of American public opinion – and justly
lost it.104
The meeting’s transcript, however, lacks any indication of an emo-
tional tone and reveals a relatively short discussion.105 Stettinius’s preex-
isting commitment to the human rights provisions addressed at the
meeting buttresses the transcript’s portrayal of an unexceptional meeting
devoid of memorable rhetoric.106
4. The Conference’s Result: The United Nations Charter
Despite the Great Powers’ ingrained positions, the charter to emerge
from San Francisco possessed modest improvements from the Dumbarton
Oaks proposals. The Charter’s preamble lists among the organization’s
aims achieving “international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or relig-
ion.”107 Furthermore, three of the organization’s principle organs—the
General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC)—possessed abilities to influence human rights.
The Charter elevated ECOSOC—a body with authority to assess
human rights concerns—from the lowly position it occupied in earlier pro-
posals to one of the principles organs of the United Nations. As a principal
organ, ECOSOC could perform studies, organize conferences and conven-
tions, and, most importantly, create human rights commissions.108 Simi-
larly, the General Assembly could discuss nearly any topic at its sessions,
102. See id. at 181.
103. See id.
104. ROGER NORMAND & SARAH ZAIDI, HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UN: THE POLITICAL
HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL JUSTICE 130 (2008).
105. See BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 190.
106. See id.
107. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
108. See LAUREN, supra note 5, at 189.
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an improvement from earlier proposals limiting acceptable discussion top-
ics, and it possessed the ability to conduct studies and issue recommenda-
tions regarding human rights promotion.109 The Security Council was
responsible for determining “the existence of any threat to the peace” and
could determine the necessary actions to “maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security.”110
The Charter also addressed the rights of indigenous people by creating
the Trusteeship System “for the administration and supervision of such
territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agree-
ments.”111 A principal purpose of the Trusteeship System was to “promote
the . . . advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories” and en-
courage their progress toward “self-government or independence.”112
In light of these improvements, why does Samuel Moyn maintain that
“San Francisco largely repeated Dumbarton, rather than unsettling it?”113
Moyn recognizes that the Great Powers were able to include rhetorical
support for human rights in the Charter, while simultaneously undermin-
ing the organization’s human rights guarantees by curtailing enforcement
powers and drafting an almost impenetrable domestic jurisdiction provi-
sion.114 Generally limited to the power to discuss, the General Assembly’s
and ECOSOC’s enhanced powers possessed limited real world effect.
Paul Gordon Lauren describes the negotiating process leading to
these empty responsibilities as follows:
Several representatives, especially those of the Great Powers, in-
dicated a willingness to include words and statements of principle
about human rights, but not provisions for practical or effective
means of enforcing them. Any proposals from other governments
that the United Nations be required to actually and actively “safe-
guard,” “protect,” “preserve,” “guarantee,” “implement,” “as-
sure,” or “enforce” human rights died an unceremonious death in
committee. Instead, the only verbs that could gain acceptance
were relatively innocuous ones such as “should facilitate,” “may
discuss,” “initiate studies,” “consider,” “make recommendations,”
“reaffirm,” “assist,” “encourage,” and “promote.”115
109. See id. at 188.
110. U.N. Charter art. 39.
111. U.N. Charter art. 75.
112. U.N. Charter art. 76.
113. MOYN, supra note 2, at 62.
114. See LAUREN, supra note 5, at 191–93.
115. Id. at 191. This analysis should not imply that rhetorical support for human rights
encouraged no progress absent adequate enforcement power. As Mark Mazower states,
[S]ufficient ambiguity was built into the UN’s approach to allow a new emphasis
on human rights to emerge during the Cold War. . . . [NGOs] found that the provi-
sions contained in the Charter permitted them to highlight issues of human rights
internationally in a way that had no precedent. . . . This state of affairs also offered
an incentive to international lawyers to develop theories of law, which rationalized
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With the General Assembly and ECOSOC devoid of any practical
power, the Security Council retained the preeminent position it had occu-
pied since the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Given the Security Council’s
unanimity requirement, this was an institutional structure all the Great
Powers could support.
The Trusteeship System’s effectiveness was similarly impeded by an
array of limiting principles. The colonial powers breathed a sigh of relief
when the system’s jurisdiction extended only to “territories now held
under mandate; territories which may be detached from enemy states as a
result of the Second World War; and territories voluntarily placed under
the system by states responsible for their administration.”116 With colonial
powers unlikely to place a territory under the System’s surveillance, over-
sight effectively extended only to former mandates of the League of Na-
tions and territories established in the wake of WWII. This was an
unsatisfactory solution to the millions of Asian and African peoples still
under colonial control.
The Great Powers, however, were not done with what Elizabeth Borg-
wardt, in A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights,
describes as “qualifications, exceptions, and omissions [to] offset many of
the changes promoting human rights.”117 Still fearful the UN’s limited ca-
pabilities could facilitate domestic intermeddling, the Great Powers re-
quired insertion of a domestic jurisdiction provision. Analogizing a
domestic jurisdiction provision in the Charter to the principles of Ameri-
can federalism, John Foster Dulles promoted the concept as “a basic prin-
ciple of the organization.”118 This concept helped ensure Senate
ratification by appeasing isolationists and reassured Soviets that the state’s
human rights abuses would remain a domestic concern.119 The final do-
mestic jurisdiction provision reads: “Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
Members to submit such matters to settlement.”120 The Security Council’s
possession of ultimate authority regarding Charter interpretation implied
that all decisions concerning what constituted domestic jurisdiction re-
quired Great Power unanimity.
activist interpretations of the Charter, the Declaration, and many of the UN’s sub-
sequent pronouncements.
Mazower, supra note 2, at 397.
116. U.N. Charter art. 77, para. 1.
117. BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 191.
118. Id. at 192.
119. See id. at 191–92.
120. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
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D. The Nuremburg Trials: Victor’s Justice and
Domestic Sovereignty’s Resistance to Human Rights
1. Germany’s Post-War Development Plan
War’s end forced the victors to confront the difficult question of how
to deal with the vanquished.121 Deciding the status of Nazi war criminals
was an integral component of Roosevelt’s plan for the post-war world, a
plan he had considered extensively in the hopes of avoiding President Wil-
son’s failures. As of September 1944, Roosevelt preferred summarily exe-
cuting all properly identified war criminals in order to avoid the
complexities of a legal proceeding,122 although he eventually changed his
mind, paving the way for the Nuremburg Charter and Trials.
In Washington, top administration officials developed competing post-
war reconstruction plans for Germany. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgen-
thau, Jr.’s plan garnered support from both Roosevelt and Churchill in
September 1944.123 The harshest of the proposed plans, the Morgenthau
Plan called for “social and educational ‘reform of the German character,’
complemented by complete disarmament, deportations of Nazi officials to
help rebuild countries they had devastated, and the partition of industrial
areas of the country into internationalized zones so they could no longer
serve as ‘the caldron of wars.’”124 As for the top layer of Nazi war
criminals, firing squads would execute them upon capture and identifica-
tion.125 While Morgenthau’s plan largely aligned with public opinion in
autumn 1944,126 some in Roosevelt’s administration recognized the plan’s
hypocrisy in light of the Atlantic Charter.
Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, adamantly opposed the Morgen-
thau Plan. In a letter to Roosevelt, Stimson directly invoked the Atlantic
Charter’s lofty rhetoric in stating, “[t]he proposed treatment of Germany
would, if successful, deliberately deprive many millions of people of the
121. Victory in Japan presented questions similar to those faced by the Allied powers in
Europe. This note only analyzes the Nuremberg Trials for two primary reasons: (1) due to its
later occurrence, the Tokyo International Military Tribunal’s legal foundation and the argu-
ments underlying this foundation were nearly identical to those of Nuremberg; and (2)
largely because of factor (1), the Nuremberg Charter continues to serve as the primary docu-
ment legitimizing war crime trials, with the Tokyo IMT serving a subsidiary justificatory role,
if any at all. For a discussion of the unique legacies of the Tokyo IMT, see NEIL BOISTER &
ROBERT CRYER, THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: A REAPPRAISAL
301–27 (2008); see also YUMA TOTANI, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 218–45 (2008). In this chapter, the author discusses
the dissenting opinion of Justice Radhabinod Pal, the Indian representative on the Tokyo
IMT. Pal’s dissent provides a scathing critique of the Tokyo IMT’s majority opinion and
further develops arguments questioning the tribunal’s jurisdiction and highlighting the ex
post facto character of the charges.




126. See id. at 208–09.
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right to freedom from want and freedom from fear.”127 Because the At-
lantic Charter failed to distinguish between victors and vanquished, Ger-
man citizens were entitled to these freedoms.128 Instead of evoking
revenge against the German people, Stimson’s plan aimed to restore Ger-
man law, order, and efficiency.129
Stimson’s more benevolent plan, however, initially failed to align with
public opinion. Any reconstruction plan that placed Germany in an equal
or potentially better position than other devastated European nations un-
derstandably evoked public ire. In contrast, the Morgenthau Plan roughly
aligned with the stance of 66 percent of Americans who wanted either to
destroy Germany as a political entity or continue supervision and control
of the state.130 Of those Americans unaccounted for, only twelve percent
sought to rehabilitate Germany.131 This minority position rose in promi-
nence once the American press received news of the Morgenthau Plan’s
draconian details. The plan’s oppressive character led one commentator to
describe it as “the product of a feverish mind from which all sense of real-
ity had fled.”132
Morgenthau, and the Roosevelt Administration in general, failed to
consider one important group’s reaction to any post-war reconstruction
plan: the German people. The Washington Post noted that Josef Goebbels,
Nazi propaganda minister, used the Morgenthau Plan to encourage
greater German resistance.133 Once American citizens established a con-
nection between the Morgenthau Plan’s oppressive design and enhanced
German resistance detailed in American periodicals, political opinion on
Capitol Hill shifted against the plan.134 With a presidential election in the
near future, the political winds of Washington swayed President Roosevelt
to shift his support to Stimson’s plan.135
The plan ultimately adopted for Germany’s post-war treatment was a
synthesis of the State and War Department approaches. Economically the
plan followed the State Department’s advice to resurrect Germany into an
127. Id. at 208.
128. See id.
129. See id. (describing Stimson’s plan as a “short-term version of the equally concilia-
tory State Department approach”).





135. Id. Analyzing Roosevelt’s initial correspondences discussing the post-war plan for
Germany highlight the shift triggered by public opinion.  In a letter sent to Secretary of War
Stimson, Roosevelt stated, “It is of the utmost importance that every person in Germany
should realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation. I do not want them to starve to
death, but, as an example, if they need food to keep body and soul together beyond what
they have, they should be fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens. . .. The
German people as a whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the de-
cencies of modern civilization.” CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL, VOL. II
1602-03 (1948)
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economically productive and democratic society. In addition to squaring
with the Atlantic Charter’s principles, the development of Germany’s
economy would, it was hoped, create a strong ally to quell the communist
threat from the East.136
But in the areas of administration, politics, and law, it was the War
Department’s proposals that won out.137 In regards to war criminals, the
War Department’s plan sanctioned three potential approaches: (1) dealing
with them by executive fiat which entailed summarily executing them or
imprisoning them; (2) granting them amnesty; or (3) putting them on
trial.138 With both options (1) and (2) untenable—the former presenting a
sharp contradiction of the Atlantic Charter and the latter politically unfea-
sible given the scale of Nazi atrocities—the Allied powers brought the top
Nazis to trial.
2. The Nuremberg Charter & Trials
Leading international jurists met in London in the summer of 1945 to
develop a legal framework for the Nuremberg trials. The ultimate product
of this meeting—the Nuremburg Charter—provided the tribunal with ju-
risdiction over crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.139
The jurists debated the potential ex post facto nature of all the
charges. Crimes against peace principally concerned waging aggressive
war, a charge the drafters believed even legal positivists would support
given the Kellogg-Briand Pact’s explicit ban of this action.140 Jurists
pointed to the Hague Conventions to justify the inclusion of the remaining
charges (i.e., war crimes and crimes against humanity).141 Because several
WWII participant states failed to sign the conventions,142 the jurists uti-
lized the developing concept of customary international law to extend the
conventions to non-signees.
This extension required two steps. First, the jurists applied the Mar-
tens clause—named after Russian scholar Feodor Martens—contained in
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. This clause stated:
136. Id. at 211.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The Nuremberg Charter was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly
just weeks after the sentences were carried out. Today the document is universally recognized
as customary international law and provides legal imprimatur to war crimes trials such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. See NORBERT EHRENFREUND, THE NUREM-
BERG LEGACY: HOW THE NAZI WAR CRIMES TRIALS CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY
123–25 (2007). For an in-depth analysis of the Nuremberg Charter’s legal legacy and contin-
ued vitality see KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORI-
GINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 369–97 (2011).
140. BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 225.
141. Id. at 227.
142. Id.
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Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued,
the High Contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in
cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhab-
itants and the belligerents remain under the protection and rule of
the principles of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity,
and the dictates of public conscience.143
The jurists argued that war crimes and crimes against humanity, al-
though explicitly absent from the Hague Conventions, had reached the
category of “usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of public conscience.”144 Therefore, both
crimes were implicitly prohibited by the Hague Conventions.
To extend the implicit prohibitions in the Hague Conventions to non-
signees, the jurists had to rely on the developing legal doctrine of custom-
ary international law.145 This doctrine, eventually enshrined in the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, granted legal effect to “international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,”146 regardless of
a state’s explicit consent. The Hague Conventions’ near universality led
the jurists to view any principles enshrined in these treaties as interna-
tional custom. This two-step justification assured the jurists that all crimes
listed in the Nuremburg Charter avoided the ex post facto conundrum.147
Determining the tribunal’s jurisdiction was only the first of many hur-
dles the Allied powers confronted during the Nuremburg process. In addi-
tion to the persistence of the ex post facto charge,148 the “victor’s justice”
allegation plagued the tribunal, as noted by Norbert Ehrenfreund in The
143. Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War (1899 & 1907), in BOG-
WARDT, supra note 2 at 226.
144. Id.
145. The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice contained one of the
first articulations of customary international law. Article 38 of the statute stated that one
source of law the League of Nations’ judicial branch could consider was “the general princi-
ples of law recognized by civilized nations.” Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Court of Justice art. 38, Dec. 13, 1920.
146. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.
147. Viewed through a modern lens, the jurists’ reasoning solely relies on the doctrine
of customary international law. However, customary international law’s novelty at the time
encouraged the jurists to reference the Marten’s clause as a concrete example of customary
international law’s influence on binding international conventions. For a reflection on the ex
post facto problem in the immediate aftermath of the Nuremburg Trials see Henry L. Stim-
son, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan. 1947, http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/70556/henry-l-stimson/the-nuremberg-trial-landmark-in-law.
148. The illegitimacy of ex post facto charges formed the root of many German defense
counsel arguments. For example, the German defense counsel relied on the si omnes clause
in the Hague Convention (1907) to refute the prosecution’s use of customary international
law. The relevant clause stated that the convention only applies to contracting parties, and
“then only if all belligerents are parties to the Convention.” Because many WWII combat-
ants had not signed the Convention, the defense counsel argued the Convention was inappli-
cable. BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 227.
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Nuremberg Legacy.149 The Soviets involvement in the tribunal only but-
tressed this criticism. How could the tribunal charge the Nazis with waging
aggressive war when the Soviets—represented by a judge on the tribu-
nal—had invaded both Poland and Finland during WWII?150 The post-
Nuremberg confirmation that the Soviets committed the slaughter of Po-
lish officers in Katyn Forest, a charge the Nazis faced at Nuremberg, bol-
stered claims of hypocrisy.151
The tribunal’s inconsistencies, and arguable hypocrisies, did not fall
solely on the Soviets’ shoulders. In a deposition to the German defense
team, a U.S. admiral confirmed the Germans’ submarine warfare strate-
gies—a component of the indictment against some defendants—was iden-
tical to the Americans’.152 To justify this obvious double-standard, the
prosecution argued that “simply because some robbers went unpunished
did not mean that stealing wasn’t a crime.”153 Supreme Court Justice Rob-
ert H. Jackson, lead prosecutor at Nuremberg, recognized that “the record
on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which history
will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to
put it to our own lips as well.”154 While true in a prospective sense, Jack-
son’s statement fails to address the freedom of Allied war criminals who
altogether avoided the chalice for their past misdeeds.
Embarrassed by some of their own domestic human rights abuses, the
Allied powers—especially the U.S.—made sure the prosecution team
drew a tight connection between crimes against humanity and either
crimes against peace or war crimes. Robert Jackson articulated this con-
nection by stating, “[t]he reason that this program of extermination of
149. Justice Jackson himself was well aware of this criticism and, at least in private,
recognized the argument’s credence. Upon Judge Biddle’s refusal to allow the prosecution
team to handle the administrative functions at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson responded that
“this was not an ordinary trial and some of the traditional rules of impartiality and indepen-
dence of the tribunal had already been swept aside when the Russian General Nikitchenko
switched from the role of negotiator-prosecutor at London to become a judge at Nurem-
berg.” EHRENFREUND, supra note 139, at 82.
150. BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 230.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 231.
153. Id.
154. Id. Justice Jackson’s ex parte contacts with the tribunal’s judges, however, tainted
the trial record of a judicial procedure already suffering from foundational infirmities. On
multiple occasions, Jackson voiced disapproval directly to American Judge Francis Biddle,
whom Jackson believed was “deliberately trying to thwart him.” While the American Bar
Association’s Canons of Professional Ethics were not directly applicable to the trial, Nurem-
berg was an Anglo-American endeavor in its judicial character and Jackson’s intention to
abide by the traditional rules governing American judicial practice was “evidenced by the
fact that before the trial he advised the judges not to hold sessions with only prosecutors
present.” This implies that Justice Jackson’s actions violated a sacrosanct principle of Ameri-
can legal practice, namely that “a lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the
Judge as to the merits of a pending case, and he deserves rebuke and denunciation for any
device or attempt to gain from a Judge special consideration or favor.” EHRENFREUND, supra
note 139, at 76–78.
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Jews and destruction of the rights of minorities becomes an international
concern is this: it was part of a plan for making illegal war.”155 This meant
that if the Nazis had not committed crimes against peace or war crimes
(i.e., Germany had not invaded any other country), then the international
community had no right to consider state-sanctioned oppression of people
within Germany. The tribunal accepted this logic, which restricted the
prosecution team to crimes against humanity stemming from the period
after the invasion of Poland, the specified starting date for crimes against
peace and war crimes.156 Borgwardt identifies the comfort this legal crea-
tion provided to officials in Washington who realized that “there was no
principle available that could capture the crimes at Kristallnacht in Ger-
many and yet spare from legal scrutiny the lynching of thousands of Afri-
can-Americans in the American South.”157
While the Nuremberg Tribunal ultimately succeeded in disposing of
top Nazi war criminals, it left many questions unanswered. Novel legal
argumentation may have justified the Nuremburg Charter’s applicability
to Nazi Officers, but it failed to explain why Allied war criminals were not
held accountable for their crimes. Requiring crimes against peace or war
crimes as an essential element of a successful crimes against humanity
charge created a convenient domestic sovereignty shield for Allied pow-
ers.158 However, this requirement produced incredulity when considered
in conjunction with the Nuremberg Charter’s explicit language that
“whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpe-
trated”159 the tribunal had authority to find guilt for crimes against
humanity.
155. BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 229.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 229–30.
158. Realist concerns help explain why the principles underlying the Nuremberg Char-
ter failed to germinate in the decades immediately following WWII. As Norbert Ehrenfreund
states,
For decades following WWII, military leaders were rarely held accountable for
their aggressions. Because of their political power they could instigate war and
commit crimes against humanity, and if later held to account, could then retreat to
live undisturbed lives in places like Panama, South America and the south of
France. Or, as in the case of Africa, continue their brutal ways in a culture of
impunity. Interest in the Nuremberg trial declined. In the late 1960s and with the
escalation of the Vietnam War, the law and concepts established at Nuremberg
took a new significance . . . [However,] those questions soon subsided and no trials
were held or even seriously considered.”
EHRENFREUND, supra note 139, at 125–26.
The dominating thesis of Samuel Moyn’s book, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in His-
tory, offers one explanation for why human rights, after a long period of dormancy, began to
rise in prominence throughout the 1970s. See MOYN, supra note 2, at 138. This rise was argua-
bly hallmarked by the establishment of war crimes tribunals for the atrocities committed in
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. For a general discussion of these tribunals, and their
roots in the Nuremberg Charter, see EHRENFREUND, supra note 139, at 153–63.
159. Nuremberg Charter art. 6.
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3. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Only a few months after the Nuremberg Trials began, the United Na-
tions began the process of developing a document to protect international
human rights, many of which were brutally violated throughout WWII. At
the General Assembly’s first session in 1946, human rights were one of a
plethora of topics competing for attention.160 The contentious political,
social, and religious concerns surrounding the drafting of a universal decla-
ration prompted the General Assembly to delegate the issue to ECOSOC.
In response, ECOSOC established the Commission on Human Rights.161
In creating the Commission, ECOSOC sought to strengthen the no-
tion of universality by requiring diverse membership. China, the United
States, Lebanon, France, the Philippines, Panama, Britain, and Uruguay
include only a handful of the states possessing representatives.162 This ge-
ographic diversity produced philosophical and religious diversity, which
inevitably led to impassioned debates concerning the source of human
rights, the degree of responsibility states have to protect human rights, and
the role of collective rights, among other topics.163
These debates validated what most astute observers anticipated: con-
structing the definitional contours of human rights was the primary obsta-
cle confronting the Commission.164 Creating a concrete definition of the
term human rights is difficult for a single individual. The Commission’s
composition forced its leaders to balance diverse and, on occasion, nearly
irreconcilable beliefs and customs to create a universal definition of
human rights, an exponentially more difficult task.165
Understanding the importance of its mission and recognizing the ob-
stacles posed by diverse philosophical and religious traditions, the Com-
mission solicited insights from preeminent philosophers throughout the
world.166 The questionnaire distributed to philosophers noted that “the
world of man is at a critical stage in its political, social, and economic
evolution” and stressed that “a common formulation of the rights of man”
was necessary “as an inspiration and as a guide to practice.”167
160. Other topics considered during the first session included genocide, gender equal-
ity, and freedom of information. LAUREN, supra note 5, at 207–08.
161. Id. at 209–10.
162. Id. at 212–13.
163. Id. at 214
164. Id.
165. Cultural relativism continues to impede the effective articulation and implementa-
tion of human rights. In the campaigns against female genital mutilation in Africa and sharia
law in the Muslim world, human rights activists consistently confront cultural relativists who
oppose their efforts as modern day imperialism. For one of many proposals on reconciling
universal human rights with cultural relativism see Diana Ayton-Shenker, The Challenge of
Human Rights and Cultural Diversity, U.N. DPI/1627/HR (March 1995), available at http://
www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm.
166. The UNESCO philosophers’ committee was responsible for sending out the ques-
tionnaire on behalf of the Human Rights Commission. ISHAY, supra note 26, at 219.
167. UNESCO, Memorandum on Human Rights, 6, Document Phil/1/1947,  (Mar. 27,
1947).
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After receiving seventy responses, ECOSOC created the special Com-
mittee on the Philosophic Principles of the Rights of Man to determine if
sufficient agreement across cultural and religious traditions existed to
form a universal declaration.168 The committee determined “common con-
victions” existed across the world, but, unsurprisingly, recognized the task
of converting these principles into a politically feasible declaration would
be exceptionally difficult.169
The Commission soon had to worry about balancing more than com-
peting philosophical and religious traditions. Cold War tensions quickly
supplanted the bonds forged in military victory and precipitated politically
contentious Commission debates.170 The Soviet and U.S. camps had com-
peting visions on what form of rights should constitute the backbone of the
declaration. Consistent with their socialist principles, the Soviets priori-
tized social and economic rights.171 The United States preferred a declara-
tion focused on civil and political rights akin to their own Bill of Rights.172
President Truman’s containment proclamation directed at Soviet ex-
pansion injected Commission discussions with vitriol and prompted accu-
sations from both sides.173 The United States highlighted the Soviets’
oppression of dissidents, censorship of opposition, and persecution of re-
ligion.174 In return, the Soviets alleged that the United States failed to
protect its citizens’ basic economic and social rights.175 By detailing the
United States’ treatment of African Americans, the Soviets depicted the
United States as a hypocritical hegemon unwilling to protect the civil and
political rights—the rights the country supposedly held dear—of its Afri-
can American citizens.176
While embarrassing, these allegations encouraged both countries to
finally agree on one issue, namely the unenforceability of whatever docu-
ment emerged from the Commission.177 Micheline Irshay notes the Rus-
168. LAUREN, supra note 5, at 216.
169. Id. at 217.
170. Id. at 219–20.
171. Some contemporary scholars believe social and economic rights are anathema to
“American individualism,” and find it surprising that the United States eventually accepted a
declaration containing references to such rights. This overlooks President Roosevelt’s use of
the word social rights to describe some of the New Deal’s protections in his 1944 State of the
Union address and the focus on the “common good that had been the framework for the
government’s role in combating economic instability at the New Deal’s apex.” Considered in
the context of the New Deal, the inclusion of economic and social rights in the declaration
appears consistent rather than incompatible with American tradition. MOYN, supra note 2, at
63–64.
172. ISHAY, supra note 26, at 221.
173. LAUREN, supra note 5, at 219.
174. Id. at 220.
175. Id.
176. Id.  For a detailed analysis of civil rights in the Cold War see MARY L. DUDZIAK,
COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS (2011).
177. After passage of the Universal Declaration, the Human Rights Committee worked
towards developing a binding human rights convention. This process was also fraught with
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sians possessed “minority status in the overall composition of the United
Nations in 1948” and therefore insisted “that the state should be left as the
primary authority for securing human rights.”178 Even though United
States’ influence dominated the United Nations in 1948, the country was
still hesitant to expose domestic mistreatment of African Americans to
international intervention. Eleanor Roosevelt, the United States’ primary
representative on the Commission, was instructed to stay focused on a
nonbinding declaration and keep all discussion regarding binding commit-
ments to a “tentative level [that doesn’t] involve any commitments by this
Government.”179
As human rights petitions from oppressed peoples throughout the
world flooded the Commission, additional governments began to oppose
adopting a binding human rights document.180 Even if a government
avoided embarrassing publicity thus far, its representatives realized that
the Commission’s acceptance of petitions exposed the government’s do-
mestic and colonial practices to international oversight.181 Paul Gordon
Lauren notes that governments preempted this scary thought by in-
structing their Commission representatives to publicly articulate the Com-
mission’s inability to consider or respond to individual complaints.182
discord, leading the Committee to bifurcate the process and develop two separate conven-
tions, one protecting civil & political rights and the other securing social & economic rights.
Completing the first draft convention only became possible once the Soviets stopped attend-
ing the Commission in early 1950. The Soviet’s withdrawal permitted progress, but as Samuel
Moyn notes, it also “cemented irrelevance at another, as human rights were revealed as use-
less in vaulting the distance between the contending ideologies of the world at the time.”
MOYN, supra note 2, at 69.
178. ISHAY, supra note 26, at 221.
179. U.S. National Archives, RG 84, Box 103, File “IO: ECOSOC, Human Rights 1946-
49,” instructions from Durward Sandifer to Eleanor Roosevelt, Feb. 5, 1947 [hereinafter
ECOSOC Human Rights Instructions]. According to Paul Gordon Lauren, Mrs. Roosevelt
viewed this instruction as “most unwelcome.” LAUREN, supra note 5, at 223. In contrast,
Jason Berger describes Mrs. Roosevelt’s support for a non-binding declaration as both per-
sonal and political. See JASON BERGER, A NEW DEAL FOR THE WORLD: ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 68 (1981). To substantiate Mrs. Roosevelt’s
personal commitment to a non-binding declaration, Berger draws from the statements of one
of Mrs. Roosevelt’s confidants who recalled,
In [Mrs. Roosevelt’s] view the world was waiting, as she said, ‘for the Commission on
Human Rights to do something’ and that to start by the drafting of a treaty with its technical
language and then to await its being brought into force by ratification, would halt progress in
the field of human rights. She spoke out, in those early days, that the world expected, and
needed, a guide to the direction that these ‘fundamental human rights,’ referred to in the
Charter of the United Nations, should take. . . . A Declaration, she pointed out, would not
require ratification, it could be approved first by the Economic and Social Council and then
adopted by the General Assembly, and thus be a great document with the seal of approval
stamped thereon by the Members of the United Nations Organization, a document incorpo-
rating the ideals and aspirations of human beings the world over. Marjorie M. Whiteman,
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Human Rights Commission, 62 AM. J. INT’L L. 918, 919
(1968).
180. LAUREN, supra note 5, at 218.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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These public statements did not stop oppressed peoples from sending
petitions. Many petitioners doubted the Commission’s ability to continue
its high-minded intellectual endeavor while ignoring a plethora of peti-
tions exposing abuses throughout the world.183 W.E.B. DuBois’s petition
condemning United States’ treatment of African Americans was particu-
larly successful at garnering worldwide attention.184 The National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) understood that
the United Nations’ response to African American suffering would fore-
cast the organization’s response to colonial oppression. As an NAACP
publication presciently stated:
The eyes and ears of the chancelleries of the world will be focused
and attuned to this petition. For depending upon what stand the
United Nations takes in this appeal will determine in part, the pol-
icy to be followed and the measures to be adopted by the colonial
powers in their future relations with their wards, and the proce-
dures to be put into practice by countries who practice some form
of discrimination. While on the part of submerged and underprivi-
leged groups, it is likely to inspire and stimulate them to carry
their cases directly to the world body in the hope of redress.185
The “submerged and unprivileged groups” soon learned that the United
Nations continued to respect domestic sovereignty, ultimately confirming
the Commission’s “declaration of impotence.”186
Two years after the Commission’s first meeting, the General Assembly
ratified what Borgwardt describes as the “toothless”187 Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights—a reference to its non-binding and purely aspira-
tional character. Of the organization’s fifty-eight member states, fifty
ratified the declaration, with the remaining states abstaining.188 Despite
the declaration’s inclusion of economic and social rights—ultimately
backed by the reluctant Americans189—the USSR abstained from voting,
“worried that this document, predominantly ‘individualist’ in its selected
183. Id.
184. Id. at 218–19.
185. Id. at 219 (quoting W.E.B. Du Bois, Statement of Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois to the Repre-
sentatives of the Human Rights Commission, located at Library of Congress, Manuscript Divi-
sion, W.E.B. Du Bois Papers, Reel 60, frames 708–09).
186. HOWARD TOLLEY, JR., THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (1987).
187. BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 264 (noting that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights was “toothless in the way the Declaration of Independence is toothless –
unenforceable in any court of law but having a moral, cultural, and even political grip that
resisted attempts by the great powers, especially the United States and the USSR, to wriggle
free.”).
188. Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Ukraine, the So-
viet Union, and Yugoslavia abstained.
189. President Truman initially opposed the inclusion of economic and social rights in
the declaration until Eleanor Roosevelt convinced Truman such principles were consistent
with her husband’s New Deal and four freedoms. ISHAY, supra note 26, at 222.
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category of rights, would challenge the sanctity of domestic jurisdiction
guaranteed by the legally binding UN charter.”190
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIMARY SOURCES: THE CASE OF THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Referencing primary sources191 helps avoid the “great downstream
flood” view of human rights history and identifies “new sources where the
river swells.”192 The authors of primary sources benefit from a greater fa-
miliarity with the interests and individuals of the period. This familiarity
often leads to more detailed and accurate accounts of events. In providing
contemporaneous accounts, authors are more likely to avoid the romanti-
cized depictions common among historians.193
Primary sources analyzing the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights’ passage highlight the document’s major limitation—its nonbinding
character. Professor H. Lauterpacht stated:
The practical unanimity of the Members of the United Nations in
stressing the importance of the Declaration was accompanied by
an equally general repudiation of the idea that the Declaration
imposed upon them a legal obligation to respect the human rights
and fundamental freedoms which it proclaimed.194
Josef L. Kunz stressed that the United Nations “cannot protect
[human rights], it cannot take action, apart from the case that the violation
of human rights constitutes a danger to peace.”195 Instead, the United Na-
tions can only “‘promote and encourage,’ ‘assist in the realization,’ ‘make
recommendations,’ ‘promote universal respect and observance’ of human
rights.”196
190. LAUREN, supra note 5, at 223. For a discussion of how to use realist international
law theory to advance idealist human rights goals see Laura S. Johnson, Prescriptive Realism
and the Limits of International Human Rights Law, 10 VERA LEX 7 (2009). Johnson observes
that squaring human rights promotion with a state’s self-interest occasionally requires coer-
cive forces. She cites both sanctions and humanitarian intervention as two tools to alter
state’s incentives. Id. at 18–20.
191. While the term “primary source” has multiple definitions, I highlight the impor-
tance of (1) sources analyzing events that are published or produced in the immediate after-
math of the events they analyze and (2) direct statements from historical figures from the time
period. In regards to the second type of primary source, Elizabeth Borgwardt provided a
great compendium of references to certain primary sources this author was unable to access
directly. See BORGWARDT, supra note 2.
192. MOYN, supra note 2, at 41–42.
193. See, e.g., FRED DAVIS, YEARNING FOR YESTERDAY: A SOCIOLOGY OF NOSTALGIA
(1979).
194. H. Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 354, 356 (1948).
195. Josef L. Kunz, The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 43 AM. J. INT’L L.
316, 318 (1949).
196. Id.
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Lauterpacht rejected arguments that the Declaration possessed any
indirect legal effect. Principal among these arguments were that the Decla-
ration contained an authoritative interpretation of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms contained in the United Nations Charter and that
upon its passage the Declaration was already a reflection of customary
international law.197 To dismiss the former argument, Lauterpacht rea-
soned that the belief a “document is not legally binding and that it embod-
ies, nevertheless, an authoritative interpretation of [the] legally binding
[United Nations Charter] is to make a statement the first part of which
contradicts the second.”198 To repudiate the latter, Lauterpacht stressed
that “various delegates. . . repeatedly denied that they were about to ac-
cept a legal obligation to adapt their national legislation to the high aspira-
tions of the Declaration.”199 Instead of immediately becoming customary
international law upon its passage, “[t]he Declaration gives expression to
what, in the fullness of time, ought to become principles of law generally
recognized and acted upon by state Members of the United Nations.”200
Authors from the period also questioned the Declaration’s moral au-
thority. Lauterpacht believed a declaration’s legal and moral authority
were two sides of the same coin, stating:
The moral authority and influence of an international pronounce-
ment of this nature must be in direct proportion to the degree of
sacrifice of sovereignty of state which it involves. . . The [moral]
authority is a function of the degree to which states commit them-
selves to an irrevocable recognition of these rights by a will and
agency other than and superior to their own.201
Kunz noted that the “crisis of Western-European culture” led to a
“new renaissance of natural law,” but he still believed any supposed natu-
ral rights “stand and fall with positive law guaranteeing them and giving an
effective remedy against their violation in independent and impartial
courts.”202
The Declaration’s nonbinding character and dubious moral author-
ity—both qualities highlighted by scholars from the 1940s—are irreconcil-
able with Lynn Hunt’s belief that the document “crystallized 150 years of
struggle for rights.”203 While the Declaration’s infirmities did not “deprive




201. Id. at 371–72.
202. Kunz, supra note 195, at 319.
203. HUNT, supra note 6, at 205. To be fair to Hunt, she mentions that the Declaration
“had no mechanism for enforcement,” id. at 204, that “human rights are still easier to en-
dorse than enforce,” id. at 208, and that “[t]he Universal Declaration initiated the process [of
advancing human rights] rather than representing its culmination.” Id. at 207. However, her
characterization of the Declaration’s passage as a crystallizing moment is wholly inconsistent
with the above limitations. Crystallization of rights requires more than transcribing them
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[the Declaration] altogether of significance or potential effect,”204 they did
caution “patience,” as John P. Humphrey noted.205 Specific instructions to
Eleanor Roosevelt to stay away from binding commitments during negoti-
ations at the Commission on Human Rights indicate that human rights
were far from crystallized upon the Declaration’s passage.206 Only in the
following decades did the document develop into customary international
law.207 An account of the Declaration’s passage as a crystallization event
offers a tempting Whig history208 that unfairly diminishes the importance
of subsequent developments actually producing a list of enforceable rights.
But this analysis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not
anomalous. Analyzing other prominent events in the history of human
rights produces similar accounts and statements in tension with common
perceptions regarding the events they concern. Illustrative examples in-
clude Winston Churchill’s quick rebuke of Clement Atlee’s depiction of
the Atlantic Charter as a universal proclamation;209 comments from Great
Power delegates at the San Francisco Conference characterizing any de-
bate regarding the United Nations’ ultimate structure as inconsequen-
tial;210 and President Roosevelt’s initial stances towards the post-war
reconstruction of Germany211 and summary execution of leading German
war criminals.212 This is unsurprising. Often, the portrayal of an important
historical event in both academia and the general public evolves to pro-
duce a consistent understanding of the event and its placement within
larger historical movements. Human beings preference for consistency
makes such depictions attractive.
However, subscribing to these understandings without referencing pri-
mary sources can be dangerous. Primary sources allow scholars to under-
stand the true significance of an event at the time it occurred and highlight
contemporary opposition forces. With this information, scholars can
search for the factors explaining the divergence between the event’s initial
significance and its modern characterization.
onto a document lacking any effective enforcement mechanism. Hunt’s characterization en-
courages readers to (1) ignore the subsequent events that actually provided the Declaration’s
listed rights international law’s imprimatur and (2) adopt an “idol or origins” view of the
Declaration rather than analyzing the distinct forces (e.g., superpower politics in the wake of
WWII) at work during negotiations that shaped the Declaration’s final content. See supra p.
4–5.
204. Lauterpacht, supra note 194, at 376.
205. John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 4 INT’L J. 351,
361.
206. ECOSOC Human Rights Instructions, supra note 179.
207. See discussion infra. p. 860.
208. Zaremby, supra note 8, at 159.
209. See BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 34.
210. See CADOGAN, supra note 99, at 742.
211. See Hull, supra note 135, at 1602-03.
212. See BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 207.
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CONCLUSION
Between President Wilson’s unprecedented proposal for an interna-
tional organization at Versailles and the United Nations’ approval of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the world saw substantial pro-
gress in the realm of human rights. To Paul Gordon Lauren this progress
reflects that human rights “visions could not be extinguished.”213 The ex-
periences of fledgling Eastern European countries at Versailles, Chinese
delegates at Dumbarton Oaks, NGOs and representatives from develop-
ing states at San Francisco, and petitioners to the Commission of Human
Rights tell a much different story. In all of these examples, realpolitik ex-
tinguished lofty human rights visions. Intense political struggles and sub-
stantial human rights shortfalls demonstrate that if there is anything
human rights are clearly not, it is “self-evident.”214
Historicism and legal realism provide insights cautioning against any
vision of human rights as self-evident. The Whig history of self-evidence
provides a simplistic and attractive historical narrative. This history, how-
ever, eschews historical nuance—an element essential to an accurate un-
derstanding of human rights history—for a romanticized depiction.
Human rights visionaries and their lofty principles play a role in
human rights history, but this role was shaped by many factors, including
colonialism, realpolitik, capitalism, and nationalism. Human rights visiona-
ries often encountered equally passionate statesmen or politicians re-
stricted by pragmatic concerns. For example, Winston Churchill’s fear of
becoming the first prime minister to “preside over the liquidation of the
British Empire”215 partially explains the inconsistency between Churchill’s
depiction of the Atlantic Charter as an “ephemeral press release”216 and
Nelson Mandela’s universal interpretation. In rare instances, human rights
visions and political interests align, as was the case with the passage of the
minority treaties. But even in this case, the inapplicability of minority trea-
ties to western European powers reveals the stains of realpolitik. Princi-
ples drawn from both historicism and legal realism encourage detailing,
rather than concealing, these stains.
Competition between a multitude of actors and interests produced
many unexpected developments throughout human rights history. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ evolution into customary inter-
national law is a prime example. Primary sources highlight the powerful
213. LAUREN, supra note 5, at 2 (2003). Lauren offers an impressive introductory his-
tory on human rights development that extensively details the role of Great Power politics
throughout this history. However, countless quotes, such as the one in the above text, depict
human rights as universal truths just waiting to take root in the proper climate. If we take
such language on its face, then Lauren views Great Power conflict and realpolitik as a mere
obstacle for these universal truths to overcome, rather than an independent force that shapes
the actual meaning and understanding of human rights.
214. HUNT, supra note 6, at 214.
215. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Speech at the Mansion House (Nov. 10, 1942)
available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421110b.html.
216. BORGWARDT, supra note 2, at 34.
860 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:827
forces constraining the Declaration’s content and restricting it to non-
binding status. Despite this unpromising start, in subsequent years the ma-
jority of states protected the Declaration’s enumerated rights. The rights
enshrined in the Declaration reflected “the general principles of law rec-
ognized by civilized nations”217 and therefore, were deemed customary
international law. Referencing contemporaneous accounts of the Declara-
tion’s passage highlights the document’s major infirmities. With knowl-
edge of these weaknesses, modern historians are forced to explain how the
document evolved into a vital component of customary international law.
Contemplation of human rights history reveals that progress at unex-
pected times or through unanticipated forces, if not the norm, is quite
common.218 The political process necessary to craft the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights underscores that human rights are not indelible
truths waiting to germinate in society through the efforts of enlightened
leaders. Instead, human rights are cast in a political oven and evolve
through the influence of diverse, and on occasion unlikely, forces.
217. See id. at 146.
218. E.g., Samuel Moyn argues that human rights concerns and progress remained rela-
tively dormant following the passage of the Universal Human Rights Declaration until the
1970s. As decolonization expanded in the 1950s and 60s, peoples still subject to the yoke of
colonization began to conflate human rights and self-determination. Both UN covenants on
human rights, which were drafted during this era, affirm the right to self-determination, a
right conspicuously absent from the Declaration. The hardening of the Cold War and the
decolonization movement redirected, or recommitted, the world’s focus to the nation-state as
the primary international concern after the brief post-war interlude focusing on individuals.
However, by the 1970s, the rate of decolonization slowed and Cold War fatigue produced a
disgruntled world populace, leading human rights (i.e., the human rights enshrined in the
Declaration as opposed to the rights espoused by the decolonization movement) to become
an attractive alternative. MOYN, supra note 2, at 62. Moyn highlights the inapplicability of
more traditional theories explaining the growth of customary international law to human
rights law by arguing such theories “of the customary growth of norms [do] very little to
explain the startling move of human rights from the periphery to the center of the discipline –
since it took place almost overnight. If ‘evolution’ there was, it occurred on a kind of catas-
trophe model, in which change happens in nonlinear moments of unforeseeable mutation: a
model that does not fit well with usual theories of customary progress in the law.” Id. at 207.
But see Caroline Anderson, Book Note, Human Rights: A Reckoning, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J.
549, 552–57 (2012) (reviewing MOYN, supra note 2) (arguing fundamental weaknesses in
Moyn’s argument stem from his failure to provide a concrete definition of human rights and,
connected to this failure, an insufficient explanation of why self-determination and group
rights are distinguishable from human rights rather than considered in the human rights
ambit).
